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ECONOMIC EFFECTS ON THE VOTE 
IN NORWAY 
Arthur H. Miller and Ola Listhaug 
A body of accumulating evidence appears to support the finding that collectivist economic 
concerns and assessments of government economic performance directly influence voting 
behavior independent of other predispositions and cleavages. This seems reasonable and is 
well documented across both cultures and time periods. What remains more inconclusive is 
how to explain fluctuations in the electoral impact of personal economic worries. Our com- 
parison of Norwegian and U.S. data has suggested that cognitive, social and political factors 
may all influence this association. The political information and cues for connecting the two 
spheres may be absent for most elections and for most people. Nevertheless, in some elec- 
tions and under certain conditions individual economic worries can have a significant, inde- 
pendent impact on election outcomes. A major goal of future political-economy research, 
therefore, should be to specify more completely those factors that facilitate the linkage of 
personal and collectivist economic concerns. 
The electoral consequences  of  economic  condi t ions  are the subject of  an  
increasingly vo luminous  literature in the Uni ted States. By compar ison,  re- 
search on  this topic in Scandinav ian  countr ies  is quite rare. However, recent 
years have witnessed an i~creasing interest in the topic a mong  both  econom-  
ists and  polit ical  scientists. 
Most  of  the Scandinavian  work in this area relies on aggregate indicators 
to determine the relationship between economics and  political behavior. Frey 
(1979), for example, employed rate of inf lat ion,  change in unemployment ,  
and growth in real income to predict the popular i ty  of  the incumben t  party 
in Denmark ,  Norway, and  Sweden over a period of 67 years. The results are 
at best mixed, He found significant political effects for inf la t ion in Denmark  
and u n e m p l o y m e n t  in Sweden. For Sweden there is also an addi t ional  effect 
of  real income growth but  on ly  in the bivariate model.  These d isappoint ing  
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results are explained by structural changes in society and the short-lived tradi- 
tion of placing economic security within the government's domain. "It may, 
for instance, be argued that voters have only held the government respon- 
sible for unsatisfactory economic conditions since the Keynesian revolution, 
i.e., since World War II" (Frey, 1979, p. 314). This interpretation is corrobor- 
ated by an analysis showing that the popularity of the Swedish government 
during the period 1967-73 was significantly related to all three economic 
indicators. 
In a similar study, Jonung and Wadensj6 (1979) predicted the popularity 
of the Swedish Social Democratic party for the period 1967-78. Their model 
incorporated monthly data on unemployment, consumer prices, and real 
income. As the Social Democrats were in power from 1967 to 1976 but not 
during the 1977-78 period, a test of the incumbency factor was possible. 
Although the estimates were sensitive to different model specifications, 
the main conclusions are fairly straightforward: unemployment, inflation, 
and to a lesser extent, decreasing real income have negative consequences for 
the Social Democrats when they govern. When they are out of power the sign 
of the coefficients reverses for inflation and unemployment, but not for real 
income growth. However, only the effect of unemployment is statistically 
significant at the .05 level in this model. 
The Swedish case has also been analyzed by Sigelman (1983) in a study 
that covers the period 1967-74. This study has two advantages over the pre- 
viously discussed works: it includes variables from a competing model of 
electoral behavior, and it uses an estimation method that is more appropri- 
ate with time series data (GLS as compared to OLS). The indicators of the 
political economy model include the demand for unskilled labor (as reported 
by Swedish firms) and the consumer price index. Two other indicators from 
a communication model are also included; the percentage of the editorials 
in newspapers with comments that are critical of the government, and the 
percentage of editorials expressing negative evaluations, regardless of their 
focus. The analysis results, when predicting the popularity of the govern- 
ment, show fairly strong effects in the predicted direction for the unemploy- 
ment indicator, and more moderate effects of the consumer price index and 
media criticism. 
By far the most advanced aggregate study has been done by Madsen (t980), 
who analyzed time series data for the Scandinavian countries for the period 
1920-75. Among the strengths of the study is the explicit consideration of 
problems in the specification of a model for multiparty systems. Since coali- 
tion governments have been more the rule than the exception in the Scan- 
dinavian countries, especially in Denmark, the question is who gets the blame 
or the benefit from changing economic fortunes. In Norway and Sweden, 
Madsen used support for the incumbent parties as the dependent variable. 
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But for Denmark, Madsen assumed that the party supplying the prime minis- 
ter will be seen as responsible for economic conditions, and he consequently 
used support for this party as the dependent variable in his model. An objec- 
tion to this approach, however, is that the prime minister may come from 
one of the smaller parties in the coalition, thus the assumption may be less 
valid than when the prime minister represents the largest or dominant party 
in the coalition. 
In addition to the conventional variables like percentage increase in real 
gross domestic product (GDP) per capita, level of unemployment, net change 
in unemployment, and inflation, Madsen also attempted to include variables 
that capture changes in the social and political system. For example, he used 
a measure of increases in tax revenue to account for the growth of the public 
sector during the period investigated. He also took into account long-term 
changes in the electoral support for the parties by constructing a normal vote 
variable that is the average support across three previous elections. 
The results of the estimation provide no support for the hypothesized 
economic effects in either Denmark (with the exception of inflation) or 
Norway. For Sweden, on the other hand, the economy is found to influence 
electoral outcomes as predicted: the incumbent party benefited from favor- 
able economic conditions and was hurt by a deteriorating economy. The 
evidence produced by Madsen (1980) for the long4erm period and the results 
of the analyses for the sixties and seventies thus makes the evidence in the 
Swedish case relatively strong. Denmark and Norway, by comparison, appar- 
ently do not fit the political economy model, at least as determined by the 
aggregate studies. 
Madsen offered two explanations for the absence of economic effects in 
Norway and Denmark. He suggested that the economic conditions in these 
small countries are dominated by fluctuations in the international economy; 
thus country specific indicators fail to capture the appropriate variance (1980, 
p. 16). Second, he argued that the impact of class differences on the vote may 
be so strong as to eliminate other effects (1980, p. 26). The difficulty with 
these suggestions, and indeed with all the aggregate analyses, is that the addi- 
tional explanatory variables are rarely included in the specified models. 
Class is only one possible cleavage that may overshadow economic effects 
in Scandinavian countries. A weakness of the aggregate studies is that they 
do not take these relevant cleavages into account in the prediction of the vote. 
This is normally not an objection against individual-level studies based on 
survey data. These studies generally incorporate a number of factors from 
competing models of electoral behavior. In principle, such studies can include 
the economic items with a number of other variables; thus we can assess the 
relative net impact of economic perceptions. 
The major study based on survey data comparing economic factors with 
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other important elements in a model of voting was done by Pettersen (1981). 
Through a set of regression equations predicting the vote for each of the 
Norwegian parties, he included independent variables from three models of 
electoral behavior: the identification model, the issue proximity model, and 
the investment model. In the investment model, he incorporated mediated 
retrospective items (assessments of the government's policies and perform- 
ance on unemployment and inflation) and simple prospective items (expec- 
tations on personal finances and fear of unemployment). Pettersen's study 
is based on data from the Norwegian Electoral Studies and covers the elec- 
tions of 1965, 1969, and 1977. 
The major conclusions are that party identification is the most important 
determinant of the vote and that issues also have some importance, especially 
in the 1977 election. Only for the 1965 election is the investment model of 
some relevance. It is important to note, however, that the 1965 study did not 
include the personal finances items. The effects of the investment model in 
that election were, therefore, attributed to mediated items only. The simple 
economic items were included in the 1977 study, but Pettersen did not ex- 
plicitly specify the relationship between the simple and the mediated items. 
It might be that the impact of personal concerns on the vote choice is depen- 
dent on the perception of how the alternative parties will handle inflation 
and unemployment. 
A question that naturally arises is, Why have so few studies been published 
on the relationship between the economy and the vote in the Scandinavian 
countries when, at least for Norway, relevant items have been included in the 
surveys from 1965 on? The answer is at least twofold. First, the standard 
model for explaining electoral behavior in the Scandinavian countries, and 
probably most clearly in Norway, has been the cleavage model (Rokkan, 
1967; Valen and Rokkan, 1974). This model sees the voters' position in the 
matrix of economic and cultural cleavages as the fundamental determinant 
of partisan affiliations. In more recent studies (Valen, 1981; Valen and Aardal, 
1983), the ideology and issue positions of the voters have been linked to their 
cleavage locations to give a more complete model of how the vote is deter- 
mined. This model does not easily facilitate the private economic concerns 
of the voter. 
Second, to the extent that economic attitude items have been studied, they 
are assumed to reflect the partisan positions of the voters and consequently 
are treated as dependent variables (Valen and Aardal, t983, chap. 10). The 
dominant view has been that there is little room for independent economic 
calculation on behalf of the Norwegian voter; they more or less automatically 
assess the parties and government alternatives from their structural positions 
and ideological inclinations, and once partisan attachment is determined, 
this strongly colors the perceived economic relevance of the parties and the 
government. 
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In summary, a review of the relevant literature provides little evidence sup- 
porting the hypothesis that economic conditions influence voting behavior 
in Scandinavia. The macrolevel studies show that economic effects are con- 
sistently found only for Sweden. However, the macrolevel studies cannot be 
viewed as conclusive, as they are often plagued by specification and measure- 
ment problems. Nevertheless, the infrequent individual-level analyses that 
have been conducted also failed to discover consistent economic effects. The 
major theoretical thrust of the microlevel studies has been to assume that 
economic judgments linking politics and economics are thoroughly con- 
founded with the predisposing effects of partisanship. 
If personal economic conditions are cognitively associated with evalua- 
tions of  government or connected with the vote choice at all, it is only done 
as an extension of  social cleavages or partisan loyalty, not as an independent, 
rational assessment of  either personal self-interest or collective benefits. 
Given these conclusions from the literature, we would predict that any eco- 
nomic effects on individual-level political behavior in Norway, the Scandi- 
navian country we focus on in this paper, would be at best weak, ~nconsis- 
tent across time, and most likely a spurious reflection of partisanship and 
other cleavages. 
PERSONAL ECONOMIC VOTING IN THE WELFARE STATE 
An alternative theory that derives from work on France suggests very dif- 
ferent expectations. Lewis-Beck (1983) reported finding a significant correla- 
tion between personal economic conditions and the vote in the French parlia- 
mentary elections of 1973 and 1978. His results are in sharp contrast to those 
that have been repeatedly documented for the United States. Economic effects 
on the vote in the United States appear to arise mainly from a concern with 
collective economic conditions rather than personal economic experiences 
(Kinder and Kiewiet, 1979). By comparison, the French data actually reveal 
a stronger impact of  economic judgments about personal experiences rather 
than about collective conditions. 
The difference in the findings for the two countries is so striking that 
Lewis-Beck invoked a "cultural" explanation for the dissimilarity. He argued 
that because of  years of  continuous growth in the centralization of economic 
authority in the French government, French voters are more likely than 
Americans to express their personal financial woes through the ballot box. 
Americans, in contrast, are assumed, on the basis of previous research (Feld- 
man, 1982; Kinder and Riewiet, 1979; Kinder and Mebane, 1983), to place 
blame on the individual more and to attribute their personal economic misfor- 
tunes to themselves or other proximal causes rather than to the government. 
The Lewis-Beck "cultural" thesis appears to be a powerful explanation for 
what has plagued U.S. researchers for some t ime-namely ,  how to explain 
306 MILLER AND LISTHAUG 
the lack of a correlation between individual economic optimism/pessimism 
and the vote. Unfortunately, Lewis-Beck did not provide data to test his 
cultural hypothesis, he merely presented it as a speculative explanation for 
the differences in the French and American data. 
The Norwegian case provides an excellent opportunity to extend the cul- 
tural hypothesis and investigate it with available empirical evidence, l Similar 
to France, the Norwegian government plays a much more pervasive role in 
directing the economic fortunes of the country than is true for the United 
States. Moreover, the welfare state is based on the principal of  equality, and 
equalization of individual economic rewards and conditions is an explicit 
goal of the society. Individualism, therefore, should be much less prevalent 
and less highly regarded as a value in Norway relative to the United States. 
Given these cultural differences we would expect, following Lewis-Beck's 
thesis, to find that: (1) Norwegians are more likely than Americans to hold 
the government responsible for economic problems; (2) personal economic 
fortunes should be more strongly correlated with both evaluations of govern- 
ment economic performance and the vote in Norway; and (3) evaluations of 
which party would do a better job in dealing with inflation and unemploy- 
ment should be more strongly associated with the vote in Norway than in 
the United States. Each of  these points is investigated in turn. 
Is Government Responsible? 
Over the years, the Norwegian election surveys have included a set of ques- 
tions asking if government policies or other causes are most responsible for 
inflation and unemployment. The responses to these questions reveal a sur- 
prisingly high percentage of individuals who see causes other than govern- 
ment actions as responsible for the country's economic ills. In each year, 
approximately half or more of the Norwegian respondents saw other non- 
governmental sources as the cause of high prices and unemployment (see 
Table 1). The only exception occurred in 1981 when 36 percent attributed 
inflation to nongovernmental causes. By comparison, between 16°70 and 32% 
pointed unequivocably to government as the most important cause of infla- 
tion and unemployment. 
Contrary to the cultural hypothesis, the Norwegian data on attributions 
for economic ills appear very similar to comparable evidence from the United 
States. In 1976, for example, three out of every ten U.S. survey respondents 
blamed the government rather than labor unions or big business for the 
economic difficulties facing the country at that time (see Table 1). Similarly, 
Kinder and Mebane (1983) reported that 18% of  the respondents in a 1979 
consumer attitudes survey mentioned government as the cause of inflation. 
Of course, it could be argued, on the basis of Table 1, that the percentage 
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Perceived Cause of Problem Data by Country and Years 
Norway 
1969 1977 1981 
Unemployment 
Government policy 16% 16% 21% 
Both 25 29 33 
Other sources 59 55 47 
Total 100% 100% 100% 
(N) (1,172) (1,322) (1,453) 
Inflation 
Government policy 20% 21% 32% 
Both 27 30 32 
Other sources 53 49 36 
Total 100% 100% 100% 






Labor unions 33 
Big business 36 
Total 100% 
(N) (1984) 
of  respondents mentioning government as the cause of  economic ills was 
much higher in Norway than in the United States. This conclusion could be 
reached by combining those who said "both" with those who unambiguously 
blamed government. Because the "both" category is difficult to interpret, the 
evidence of Table 1 appears troublesome but inconclusive for the cultural 
thesis. Despite this lack of  definitiveness the data suggest that, although 
government is seen as a prominent cause of economic problems, it is not the 
most predominant culprit in either society. While government may be faulted 
by many citizens for not solving economic problems, relatively few people 
see government as the cause of those difficulties. 
Are Personal and Collective Economics Connected? 
The cultural thesis also leads us to expect a relatively stronger correlation 
in Norway than in the United States between optimism/pessimism about 
one's personal economic situation and collective economic judgments, in a 
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TABLE 2. Correlations of  Personal Economic Concerns With Assessed Economic 
Performance of  Parties and the Vote ~ 
Inflation Unemployment Vote 
Norway 
1969 .04 .01 .08* 
1973 b b - . 0 2  
1977 - .08* - . 0 6  - .07* 
1981 .19'* .20** .30** 
United States 
1976 - .15"*  - .08* .09* 
1978 .07 .05 .08 
1980 .07" .06* - . 1 0 "  
1982 - .22** - .18"*  .10' 
"Personal economic concerns was coded: 1 = personal financial situation will be better in coming 
year; 3 = same; 5 = worse. Party performance for Norway was coded: 1 = better by Socialists; 
3 = same; 5 -  better by Bourgeois. For the U.S. it was: 1 = better by Democrats; 3 = same; 
5 = better by Republicans. Vote in Norway and the U.S., respectively, was coded: 1 = Socialist 
parties, 2 = Bourgeois parties; 1 = Republican, 2 = Democrat. 
*p <.01; **p < .001. 
welfare state, the government  explici t ly acts as the p lann ing  agent  for eco- 
nomic  stability, not  jus t  at  the na t iona l  level but  at the ind iv idua l  level as 
well. We might ,  therefore, expect  the average cit izen to l ink these economic  
spheres cognitively. In  the Uni ted  States, however, there should  be litt le or  
no re la t ionship  between persona l  and  collective economic  evaluat ions  be- 
cause government  is "relat ively f ragmented  and nondirect ive,  at least with 
regard to people ' s  economic  life" (Lewis-Beck, 1983, p. 355). 
Aga in  ,are f ind litt le evidence to suppor t  the  par t  o f  this  cul tural  hypothesis  
tha t  focuses on Norway.  In 1969, 1973, and  1977, only  weak corre la t ions  exist 
between judgments  regarding personal  economic condit ions and either govern- 
ment  economic  pe r fo rmance  or  the vote (see Table 2). This  pa t t e rn  o f  rela- 
t ionships  is s imilar  to that  found in the Uni ted  States for 1976, 1978 and 
1980. F r o m  those years one would conc lude  tha t  assessments  o f  persona l  
economic  condi t ions  are not  pol i t ic ized in ei ther  country.  The  results would 
also clear ly cont rad ic t  the cul tural  hypothesis .  
However,  1981 in Norway  and  1982 in the  Uni ted  States provide  a cur ious  
a n o m a l y  for  bo th  the cul tural  hypothesis  and  previous work  on economic  
polit ics.  In  bo th  countr ies  for  those  years we f ind a s t ronger  l inkage between 
personal  economics  and  pol i t ical  evaluat ions.  2 Clear ly  cul tural  differences 
do not  explain  this sharp ly  s t ronger  assoc ia t ion  between persona l  and  collec- 
tive economic  judgments .  We suggest that  the issues and tenor  o f  the poli t ical  
debate  in those elections focused more  clearly on economics  and par t icu la r ly  
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TABLE 3. Correlations of Vote With Assessed Economic Performance of Parties 
Inflation Unemployment 
Norway 
1969 .39 o .40 
1977 .45 .46 
198t .49 .48 
United States 
1976 .61 .52 
I978 .50 .41 
!980 .62 .57 
1982 .48 .44 
aAll correlations are positive, indicating that people were more likely to vote for the party they 
thought would do a better job in dealing with the economic problem. All correlations are sig- 
nificant well beyond the .00I level. 
on the implications of  government economic policies for individual prosper- 
ity. In Norway, for example, inflation had reached 14% in 1981, and Kaare 
Willoch, then floor leader of  the Conservatives and later prime minister, 
directed considerable criticism during the campaign toward the economic 
record of the ruling Labour party. Similarly, the 1982 U.S: congressional elec- 
tions were held amid considerable discussion of Reagonomics, cuts in social 
welfare programs, growing unemployment,  remaining fears of  inflation, and 
a world wide recession. 
In short, we speculatively suggest that an interaction between the economic 
nature of  the times and the discussion of economic problems by the candi- 
dates and the media produced the increased politicization of the personal 
financial assessments. This outcome suggests two additional conclusions. 
First, the link between individual and collective judgments may have more 
to do with specific political campaigns and the transmission of political in- 
formation than with cultural differences. Second, generalizations regarding 
the independence between personal and collective economic beliefs need to 
be specified more clearly. 
Are Assessments of Government Economic Performance Reflected in the Vote? 
One last prediction of the cultural hypothesis is that evaluations of  govern- 
ment economic performance should be more strongly reflected in the vote 
of  a welfare state than is true for the United States. Again the data fail to 
support  this prediction. In fact, as the correlations in Table 3 demonstrate, 
the vote and performance judgments are often more strongly associated in 
the U.S. data. The impact o f  economic performance on the vote choice in 
Norway has, however, increased over the years. 
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Partly the increased correlations reflect a shift by the public away from 
the perception of the bourgeois parties as less capable than Labour in deal- 
ing with economic problems. In 1969 the socialist parties were perceived as 
more likely to deal effectively with the economy by roughly two to one over 
the bourgeois parties. By 1981 this had changed considerably. In that year 
the socialist and bourgeois parties were mentioned by nearly equal percent- 
ages as the party best able to handle unemployment and the bourgeois had 
surpassed Labour in the public's estimation as the party most capable of con- 
trolling inflation. 
The strong correlations between the vote and these mediated economic 
evaluations of which party would better handle economic problems raise 
several other theoretically relevant questions. First, in those years when we 
find a significant zero-order correlation between personal economic condi- 
tions and the vote, is this relationship reduced to insignificance by control- 
ling on the party evaluations? Second, in a more fully specified model incor- 
porating class ideological and partisan cleavages, do either the personal or 
collective economic judgments continue to have any independent effect on 
voting behavior? 
In contrast to the Lewis-Beck (1983) finding, both Fiorina (1981) and 
Kinder and Mebane (1983) have proposed models that argue for no indepen- 
dent, direct effects of the individual's personal economic situation on the 
vote. According to these models, personal economic distress is connected 
with the vote only through politicized intervening variables such as govern- 
ment economic performance or perceptions of how the broader economy is 
functioning. The Norwegian data for both 1969 and 1981 offer examples that 
are contrary to the U.S. models. After controlling for the inflation and un- 
employment party performance measures, personal finances were still signifi- 
cantly, albeit weakly, correlated with the vote in 1969 and rather strongly 
correlated in 1981 (Beta = .18). 
Specifying the model more fully does reduce personal finances to an in- 
significant level for the 1969 data, but not in 1981 (see Table 4). In general, 
the Norwegian data suggest that as the more traditional cleavages associated 
with class and party loyalties have decayed, economic performance has come 
to the fore as a major determinant of the vote. Contrary to what was sug- 
gested by the earlier macrolevel studies, economic factors appear to have 
influenced the vote choice rather strongly in recent elections. Indeed, the 
fairly recent rise in the importance of the economic factor may explain the 
absence of economic effects in the earlier macrolevel studies of Norway, as 
well as the disregard for these factors in the microlevel analyses. 
Of course, one might argue that part of the relationship between the vote 
and the economic indicators is a reflection of reciprocal causation originat- 
ing in other prior predispositions or the vote choice itself. Clearly we have 
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TABLE 4. Regression Coefficients for a More Fully Specified Model Predicting the 
Vote a 
Norway 
Predictors 1969 1977 1981 
Personal finances .01" - .02* .13 
Party best-inflation .14 .19 .22 
Party best-unemployment .16 .23 .20 
Left/Right ideology .28 .27 
Party identification .44 .21 .24 
Class .22 .19 .11 
R .69 .70 .72 
United States 
Predictors 1976 1978 1980 1982 
Personal finances .01" .02* - . 0 8  .02* 
Party best-Inflation .26 .22 .31 .12 
Party best-unemployment .20 .09 .15 .10 
Liberal/conservative .13 .05* .04* .02* 
Party identification .33 .42 .41 .47 
Class .03* .01" .05* .01" 
R .73 .64 .76 .63 
aVote in Norway was coded: l = Socialist, 2 = Bourgeois. In the U.S., it was coded: 1 = Repub- 
lican, 2 = Democrats. 
*Denotes coefficients that are n o t  significant at the .05 level. All other entries are significant 
at the .01 level or better. 
not  tested for all these reciprocal relationships. Our  task has been a more 
modest  one o f  a t tempting to determine if there is any independent  effect o f  
economic  considerations after controlling for all those other assumed prior 
predispositions. Having incorporated the major  alternative explanations for 
the vote, we feel rather safe in concluding that in Norway there is definitely 
an impact  o f  the economy which is independent  o f  part isan ideological and 
social cleavages. For 1981, this economic effect appears quite similar to Lewis- 
Beck's French findings and cont rary  to the U.S. models. Nevertheless, there 
is little evidence to suggest that  this result can be explained by a "cultural" 
difference. 
SPECIFYING THE CONNECTION BETWEEN ECONOMICS AND POLITICS 
Having dismissed the "cultural" explanation for the 1981 results, it be- 
hooves us to provide some other  individual-level explanation. Following the 
lead o f  Kinder and Mebane (1983), we can search for those factors that might 
increase the availability o f  informat ion that would facilitate the cognitive link 
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between economics and politics. We might expect, for example, that since 
there was a significant rise in the proportion of the Norwegian population 
blaming the government for inflation in 1981 (recall Table 1), that this fostered 
a closer tie between personal economic worries and political behavior in that 
year. Similarly, we might predict that people who are better informed and 
intensely interested in politics may have either more fully developed political 
schemas or stronger partisan attachments which facilitate the connection be- 
tween economic concerns and political choices. 
Before turning to these psychological or cognitive factors which can in- 
fluence the linkage between private economic concerns and the vote, we will 
also consider one social factor. Kramer (1983) has argued that observable 
changes in individual welfare may be caused by two unobservable com- 
ponents, one which is government induced, and hence politically relevant, 
and one which is caused by life cycle and other politically irrelevant factors. 
His argument suggests that issues of personal finances may be of greater 
relevance for individuals who are more closely linked to the government sec- 
tor and be of less relevance for persons making their fortunes outside the 
direct reach of government economic decisions. While this latter group may 
be considered very small in a society like Norway, the degree to which the 
government is an important cause in determining personal welfare certainly 
varies across individuals. 
We propose that persons employed in the public sector of the economy, 
for example, will be more influenced by the economic decisions of the govern- 
ment than persons employed in the private sector. Consequently, the linkage 
between economic concerns and voting should be stronger for the former 
than for the latter group. If this were true, it would also help explain the 
increased importance of economic factors in voting behavior during recent 
years, as the public sector grew rapidly between 1969 and 1981. 3 
We do, in fact, find the predicted pattern for I969 and 1977. Among per- 
sons employed in the private sector of the economy, there was virtually no 
relationship between personal finances and the vote, while the correlation is 
moderately strong for those employed in the public sector (see Table 5). How- 
ever, in 1981 the pattern reverses: the correlations for both sectors are signifi- 
cant, but personal economic concerns and the vote are most strongly asso- 
ciated among respondents employed in the private sector. The 1981 results, 
therefore raise serious doubts about employment in the public sector as a suf- 
ficient condition for specifying the connection between personal finances 
and the vote. 
Of course, it may be that people employed in the private sector in 1981 
were even more likely than those in the public sector to hold government 
responsible for their economic fortunes. Kinder and Mebane (1983) argued 
that how individuals explain their economic situation strongly conditions 
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TABLE 5. Correlation Between Personal Financial Concerns and tile Vote Control- 
ing for Specifying Variables-Norway 
Specifying Variables a Correlations 
Employment by sector." 1969 1977 1981 
Private - .01 .01 .40** 
Public .16* - .  12"* .24** 
Blame government for unemployment: 
No .02 - .02 .33** 
Partly .20** - .03 .25** 
Yes .08* - .09* .17"* 
Blame government for inflation: 
No .02 - .02 .27** 
Partly .13"* - .  13** .26** 
Yes .04 - .07 .19"* 
Strength of party identification: 
Independent .02 - .01 .14"* 
Weak .08* - .07* .26"* 
Strong .09* - .  11"* .42** 
aVote was coded: 1 = Socialists, 2 = Bourgeois. Economic concerns were coded: 1 = personal 
financial situation will be better in coming year; 3 = same; 5 = worse. 
*p <.01; **p < .001. 
the re la t ionship  between persona l  economic  worries and  pres ident ia l  voting.  
They predict  tha t  the re la t ionship  a m o n g  those  who have "col lect ivis t"  eco- 
nomic  views and  ho ld  government  responsible  for the state o f  the economy 
should  be weaker  than  for  those  who are "pr ivat is t ic"  and  a t t r ibu te  the cause 
for economic  p rob lems  to nongovernmenta l  sources. 
This theory  would  predict  a s t ronger  l inkage  between persona l  f inancia l  
prospects  and  the vote for persons  who b lame  the government  for unemploy-  
ment  or  in f la t ion  than  for those  who say the causes lie elsewhere, The  em- 
pi r ica l  evidence f rom Norway,  however, is less than  ful ly suppor t ive  o f  the 
hypothes is  for 1969 and  1977 because  the corre la t ions  are s l ightly s t ronger  
for those  who b l ame  the government  than  for those  who don ' t  (see Table 5). 
But the difference between the cor re la t ions  is so small  as to be ins ignif icant .  
Moreover,  the 1981 da ta  c lear ly  con t rad ic t  the hypothes ized  pat tern .  
A l t h o u g h  cont ro l l ing  for the perceived cause o f  economic  p rob lems  fails 
to conf i rm the K i n d e r / M e b a n e  thesis, it may  suggest an a l ternat ive theory.  
U p o n  closer examina t ion ,  the pa t t e rn  o f  cor re la t ions  ob ta ined  af ter  control -  
ling for the perceived cause o f  in f la t ion  and  u n e m p l o y m e n t  appears  some-  
what  curvil inear.  Tha t  is, the  corre la t ions  tend to be s t ronger  for people  
saying that  the government  is par t ly  to b lame  for economic  ills than  for those 
who hold  government  ent i rely responsible.  This difference might  reflect a 
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greater degree of political sophistication among the former than among the 
latter group. Certainly a reasonable view is that the government alone can 
only partially control unemployment and inflation. Blindly "blaming" the 
government, therefore, may actually reflect somewhat less political-economic 
sophistication, which in turn increases the difficulty of translating personal 
economic experiences into voting behavior. 
This suggests the possibility that the connection between personal eco- 
nomic conditions and political behavior may have more to do with cognitive 
structuring than with attributing the cause of economic woes to particular 
sources. The connection may simply be more dependent on how well-in- 
formed and capable the person is to abstractly conceptualize politics. The 
richer the person's cognitions of politics, the more likely they should be 
expected to connect economic conditions and political preferences. 
Whereas it is difficult to provide definitive proof for this argument, we 
have found some rather convincing evidence. First of all, we find stronger 
correlations between personal finances and the vote among people who are 
more interested in politics. Moreover, since strength of party identification 
indirectly indicates both the richness of political cognitions and the ability 
of a person to structure political experiences, we would expect it to be the 
mediating variable par excellence. Previous research shows that strong identi- 
fiers are much more likely to relate their views to political parties and to 
politicize their experiences. We would expect, therefore, that the link between 
economic concerns and the vote will depend on the strength of party identifi- 
cation. Strong identifiers should be more likely than independents to make 
the connection. 
Unlike the results obtained with the previous controls, those for varying 
levels of party strength are both supportive of the hypothesis and consistent 
across all the years (see Table 5), Strong identifiers, particularly in 1981, were 
indeed more likely than Independents to link the vote and personal economic 
concerns. A similar analysis performed with the U.S. data reveals the same 
pattern of results especially for the years 1976 and 1982. 
How are we to interpret the pattern of correlations obtained with the vari- 
ous specifying variables? In general, all three indicators (sector of employ- 
ment, blaming government, and strength of party identification) appear to 
reflect factors that influence a person's ability to translate personal economic 
concerns into political behavior. Yet the three variables give rise to somewhat 
different interpretations. Both employment in the public sector and strength 
of partisan attachment lend themselves to a more benign interpretation than 
the one derived from the attribution of responsibility items. 
In the latter case, we assume that citizens are consciously aware of the 
impact that government actions have on their own economic conditions and 
they punish the incumbents for detrimental outcomes. In the former case, 
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TABLE 6. Correlation Between Personal Financial Concerns and the Vote Control- 
ling for Strength of Partisanship and Focus of Responsibil ity-United 
States ~ 
Strength of Party Identification 








.02 - .07 .04 
.07 - .08 .09 
.09 - . 1 t  .19"* 






aVote was coded: 1 = Republican, 2 = Democrat. Economic concerns were coded: 1 = personal 
financial situation will be better in coming year; 3 = same; 5 = worse. 
*p< .01; **p<.001. 
certain individuals, because of  their occupational location, connection with 
partisan organizations, or self-interest, have available or seek out and are 
better prepared to utilize political-economic information. The connection 
between economics and partisan choices are, therefore, more readily made 
and used by these people in making electoral decisions. In short, their under- 
standing of  economics is more politicized regardless of  whether or not they 
blame the government for their own personal economic conditions. 
The Norwegian data separating these two potential connections are quite 
conclusive. There is no correlation between strength of  partisan identifica- 
tion and blaming the government for inflation or unemployment,  tn addi- 
tion, the correlation between personal finances and the vote fails to vary 
systematically with respect to blaming the government after having first con- 
trolled for strength of party identification. In brief, the link between personal 
economic assessments and the vote is enhanced by strength of partisanship 
and not by attributions of  economic responsibility. 
Data from the United States, on the other hand, suggest that both blaming 
the government and strength of  party at tachment help mediate the connec- 
tion between personal economics and the vote choice (see Table 6). For 
Independents or those who do not hold the government responsible for 
economic problems, there is no linkage between personal finances and the 
vote, whereas quite a significant correlation is found for strong identifiers 
(particularly in 1976 and 1982) or for those who blame the government. Un- 
fortunately, 1976 is the only year we can test for the effects of  blaming the 
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government as this measure was not included in other National Election 
Studies (NES) surveys. Nonetheless, the 1976 data demonstrate that both 
factors independently help facilitate the connection of everyday economics 
with politics. The weakest correlation occurs among Independents who do 
not blame the government and the largest for strong identifiers who hold the 
government responsible. 
The difference between the U.S. and Norwegian results when controlling 
for both strength of party identification and blaming the government may 
arise from a difference in the functions of political parties in the two coun- 
tries. In Norway, the party organizations are a major source of political 
information for the voter. But in the United States, very little political infor- 
mation originates directly from the political parties. Strength of party iden- 
tification in the United States, therefore, is more an indicator of self-motiva- 
tion, whereas in Norway it also reflects integration into a network of political 
communications and organizational activities. In addition, the findings re- 
ported here fit nicely with Fiorina's (1981) suggestion that partisan attachment 
is heavily influenced by retrospective assessments of how well the parties have 
performed in office. Given this argument then, we would have expected to 
find, as we do, a closer linkage between economic performance attitudes and 
the vote among stronger identifiers. 
CONCLUSIONS 
Contrary to the earlier macrolevel studies, we have found a strong and 
systematic impact of economic concerns on political behavior in Norway. As 
the social cleavages that traditionally dominated Norwegian politics dissi- 
pated, economic factors came to have an increasingly powerful influence on 
election outcomes. The absence of economic effects in the macrolevel studies 
may, therefore, have been an accurate representation of an earlier period in 
Norwegian political history, rather than the result of statistical limitations. 
One major problem with macrolevel studies, however, is that they are not 
sensitive to shifts in social and political forces as they are occurring. 
The microlevel data, on the other hand, provide tess than conclusive evi- 
dence as a counter to the "small nations" argument, which has been raised 
by the macrostudies. Economic conditions in smaller countries with open 
markets are subject to political decisions and economic fluctuations in other 
countries. Politicians in these smaller nations frequently point to fluctua- 
tions in the world economy as the culprit for economic problems at home. 
Voters in Norway and other small countries, therefore, might be less likely 
to translate economic grievances into votes against the incumbent because 
they might perceive the incumbent as exercising little control over economic 
conditions (Lewis-Beck, 1982). 
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The 1969 and 1977 Norwegian data showing insignificant relationships 
between personal economic conditions and the vote actually fit the smaller 
nations explanation. Likewise, the appearance of  a strong relationship in 
1981 may be interpreted as reflecting the influence of  the worldwide reces- 
sion occurring at that time rather than a public reaction to the economic 
policies of  the Norwegian government. However, one piece of evidence that 
contradicts the external forces thesis is the 1969-to-1981 rise in the percentage 
of Norwegians blaming the government for inflation and unemployment. 
Another is the increasing impact on the vote found for perceptions of  which 
party would better handle economic difficulties. 
These trends seem to suggest that Norwegian politics are becoming less a 
reflection of the vagaries of external market conditions and more sensitive 
to questions of  economic self-determination. This change may have been 
enhanced by a number of factors including the 1972 debate over membership 
in the European Economic Community, the discussions surrounding the 
development of off-shore oil, as well as the criticisms which Conservative 
politicians have leveled against the economic policies of  the previously domi- 
nant Labour government. Now that the Conservatives have been in office 
since 1981, it remains to be seen how important internal economic conditions 
are for their reelection in 1985. But a definitive determination of whether 
the election outcome reflects internal or external economic forces cannot be 
obtained without directly exploring the assumptions of the smaller nations 
thesis. Future studies in Norway, therefore, should attempt to ascertain if 
voters are less likely to hold their government responsible for economic con- 
ditions because they attribute the cause to uncontrollable external factors. 
A variation on the "cultural" hypothesis may also merit further attention. 
Whereas we found little support for this thesis as articulated by Lewis-Beck, 
the Norwegian data do suggest that differences in the political structures of  
various countries might influence the link between personal economics and 
political behavior. Namely, cross-cultural differences in the type of  party 
structure and the party functions may help explain variation in the extent 
to which personal economic factors are important determinants of  the vote. 
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NOTES 
1. The Norwegian Election Surveys are based on personal interviews with a cross section of 
Norwegian adults. The sampling procedure has two stages. In the first stage a number of 
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geographical areas are randomly chosen. These areas are stratified by region, socioeconomic 
characteristics of the "kommuner," and size of population. Within each area (sampling unit) 
a random sample of persons are selected. In the election studies 1957-73 the lists of all voters 
("manntallet') were used to select the individuals. In the two most recent studies the person 
register of the Bureau of Statistics has been employed. The U.S. data in each case derive 
from the American National Election Studies conducted by the University of Michigan, 
Institute for Social Research. 
2. A close inspection of the sign of the correlations for the 1981 Norwegian data reveals what 
might initially also be regarded as an anomaly. In that year, those who expected to be worse 
off in the future voted more heavily for the Labour party, the ruling party at that time. 
Normally we would expect economic pessimists to vote against the ruling party, but in 1981 
the widespread anticipation that the bourgeois parties would win the election may have in- 
creased economic optimism among their supporters. Those who thought they would be 
worse off logically voted for Labour, as it was under a bourgeois government that they expected 
to be worse off. The pattern of correlations thus fits with what we would normally expect, 
that is, people vote for the party that they think will promote the most beneficial economic 
conditions. The important difference in 1981, therefore, is not the sign but the strength of 
the correlation. 
3. The differentiation of private and public employment is based on the self-report of the 
respondents. This categorization of private and public sector occupations, therefore, may 
be less precise than the work of others (see, for example, Kolberg, 1983) but shows the same 
trend. The Norwegian Election Survey data reveals 30% of the 1969 sample employed in 
the public sector as compared with 44% in 1981. 
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